Also this:
The scary part is there’s no encryption and many things are done without authentication, meaning with a little reverse engineering you can probably shut down the power to anyone on the not-so-smart grid.
The scary part is there’s no encryption and many things are done without authentication, meaning with a little reverse engineering you can probably shut down the power to anyone on the not-so-smart grid.
... it remains to be seen if the new [NIST and FERC] specifications will be secure enough to stop the bad guys.I don't want to be rude and mean no offense to the writer of an otherwise reasonable article. Yet though I hold no security patents, nor have ever written more than a few lines of Pascal in college, I nevertheless have plenty of experience to say with certainty:
Nothing remains to be seen. Specifications do not stop determined bad actors, on the Smart Grid or elsewhere.Yet even more to the point: the question posed is not a useful line of inquiry. A more immediately practical exercise would be built around this idea: Despite the best efforts of standards bodies and technology providers, some, if not many, adversaries will successfully breach different lines of defense built into and around Smart Grid systems. Two questions worth asking, then, are:
But some security experts say the standards do not go far enough. The technology of the electric grid was designed with the expectation that it would be a private network rather than an interconnected IP-addressable system, and the security standards focus largely on reliability rather than network integrity.
“I don’t think in today’s world that is even close to being adequate security,” said Jack Danahy, chief technology officer of Ounce Labs. “There has to be a more expansive understanding of what security means.”
The cyber security of the power system is taking on more urgency with development of a new interactive smart grid and recent reports that hackers have compromised the current grid.
There are only two things wrong with today's in-home displays for energy management: (1) they suck for utilities and (2) they suck for consumers.Among the encyclopedic list of HAN vendors shortcomings is a failure to appreciate homeowners' security concerns, as in:
When they talk to utilities, most HAN vendors reveal their lack of understanding of the utility charter and mindset. They chatter about entrepreneurial opportunity, or pioneering new markets, or liberating consumer data. They fail to discuss maintaining reliability, or justifying technology to regulators, or safeguarding privacy and security.For full article click here.