Showing posts with label substations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label substations. Show all posts

Wednesday, February 12, 2014

Please Remain Calm: My Metcalf Substation Physical Security Take-Aways

Valentines Day update - Two more good links have surfaced for you since I wrote the original post a few days ago:
PBS Interview with Jon Wellinghof and Mark Weatherford 
A 3rd WSJ article, this one largely a counterpoint to the more FUD-oriented first one
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It's been nearly 10 days now since the Wall Street Journal published its big story on the attack on a transmission substation outside Silicon Valley in California.  Since then, the media, keying on words like "assault, military-style, terrorism" have had a pre-apocalyptic field day.

So in my own way, I've been running a counter-alarmism campaign when speaking with the press as well as with infrastructure security experts about to go live on one of the hysterical "news shows."

My main points are:

  • This attack was significant but it didn't cause a blackout
  • So be concerned, but don't overreact
  • You can thank the hard work and preparation by Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) for at least 2 things: 1) rerouting energy flows so there was no perceptible customer impact despite the loss of many transformers, and, 2) getting the substation fully back on line within one month
  • This was a great opportunity for utilities to refresh their physical security policies, and that's what they're doing right now
  • Utilities are already taking concrete steps to deter this type of attack, including: erecting screens or walls to block a would-be shooter's view of his/her intended targets, inviting citizens living near substations to call their utilities if they see something suspicious, in the spirit of the "if you see something, say something" transit security campaign, and looking at the transformer stockpiling and loaner program 

Monday, August 5, 2013

Joe Weiss on a New (or Newly Discovered) Risk to Substations

Control Systems security guru Joe Weiss recently wrote up his observations of a problem reported at a nuclear power facility wherein a transformer load tap charger (LTC) malfunctioned, wasn't detected in a timely manner, and could have caused trouble.

LTCs are used in ALL (Joe's emphasis) substation transformers and are designed to be remotely accessible.  But his bigger point, as he wrote me separately is that:
This incident can affect EVERY (again) electric substation - I found it because it affected a nuclear plant and an unusual event notice was issued - and [note] the word "cyber" was never used.
Key words here: "remotely accessible." Not something you want to see too often in an incident at or near a nuclear plant. You can read his full post at the URL for his Control Global blog provided below.

Also, Joe was recently quoted in an MIT Tech Review article on an attack on a water plant honey pot. You'll find a URL for that piece piece below as well.

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URLs

Control Global

http://community.controlglobal.com/content/system-still-broken-failure-cyber-sensitive-substation-device-affecting-nuclear-plant


MIT Tech Review

http://www.technologyreview.com/news/517786/chinese-hacking-team-caught-taking-over-decoy-water-plant/